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241K REVIEW
Bogen on Social Theory, Rules, and Order*
David Bogen, Order Without Rules: Critical Theory and the Logic of
Conversation. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1999. 188 pages including
bibliography and index.
Social science at the beginning of the new millennium is nothing if not
constantly expanding its substantive foci, in effect problematizing certain
fundamental areas of reality and suggesting that these areas represent central
or core objects of study. The idea of “central concept” has become so
widespread now that the traditional way of parsing up areas of study by
discipline (economics, sociology, psychology, anthropology, political science,
history, etc.) has fallen into disrepair.
Some of these central concepts are gender, race, culture, the self, control,
power, systems, personality, social space or distance, birth, death, chemicals
or hormones, communication, and with regard to the latter more specifically,
talk. It is this last concept, talk, that takes center stage in David Bogen’s Order
Without Rules: Critical Theory and the Logic of Conversation.
Bogen’s book is somewhat deceiving, for although small in size (188 pages)
its analytical ambitions are huge. Bogen is dealing simultaneously with speech
act theory; ethnomethodology; the problems of foundationalism, meaning, and
order; conversation analysis; Wittgenstein; Habermas, and critical theory.
Before I even get to an explanation of what it is he is up to, I first want to state
that, although there are some rough spots, Bogen has done a good job of taking
a group of disparate and even antagonistic theoretical and methodological
programs and weaving them into a coherent problematic.
Bogen’s Problematic
I refer to Bogen’s narrative as a “problematic” insofar as various key players
or ideas are introduced to bring into relief other thinkers who, although
working in the same substantive area – talk or communicative interaction –
hold vastly different conceptions of how best to make sense of this elusive
*I thank Philip Manning for commenting on an earlier version of this paper.
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concept. Bogen chooses to analyze the battle over talk that a number of
disparate analysts and practitioners have waged as paradigmatic of an even
more fundamental disagreement over (social) scientific visions and practices
of logic, rules, and order. The starting point is Winch’s (1958) commentary
on Weber’s notion that the natural sciences are fundamentally different than
the social sciences insofar as the former are concerned with causal explanations
of relationships between physical phenomena while the latter are concerned
with the reasons – that is, the motives and intentions – lying behind why
individual or collective actors engage in certain forms of social behavior. This
is the Verstehen tradition in German sociology, associated strongly with
Weber’s dictum that in order to explain social phenomena sociologists ought
to work at the level of meaning of the actors involved in order to understand
the reasons the actors acted the way they did. Since science is concerned with
developing general knowledge, Weber’s problematic was closing the gap
between what objectively is observed and why subjectively it was done. In
other words, Weber’s focus was on developing a methodology by which the
subjective states of a multitude of actors could be discerned in some systematic,
“rational” way.
Winch goes on to point out Weber’s error: the meaning of social action is
not dependent on the “inner” mental life of individual actors. Here Winch is
heavily influenced by a reading (problematic in its own right) of Wittgenstein’s
notion of “language game.” The way we understand our own actions is the
same way we understand others’ actions, insofar as there exists a number of
publicly organized and ratified social conventions – “talk” being one of the
most important – by which shared forms of life are created and sustained.
Since, according to Winch, Wittgenstein has shown how language is organized
by social convention – and so in this nontranscendental, normative sense is
rule-governed – the meaning of our actions can be traced back to language
itself as an externally visible and available resource. With language and the
practical contexts within which it occurs being seen as the proper basis of
meaning and rationality, one need not invoke the hoary notion of “mind” or
“subjective states” when dealing with social phenomena. Most importantly,
as Bogen notes, Winch (1990, p. 52) argues that “all behavior which is
meaningful (therefore all specifically human behavior) is ipso facto rule
governed.”1
Rules, Rules, Rules
In rejecting Weber’s Verstehende sociology, Winch is attempting to follow
Wittgenstein’s (1958) notion of language games, as previously noted. One of
the standard implications of this position is that, since language has a set of
rules (of syntax, phonetics, prosody, etc.) by which competent speakers are
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able to communicate, so too must there be a set of rules available to actors by
which everyday life is made meaningful and intelligible. This “rules argument”
approach is not only Winch’s, but is shared by a number of scholarly traditions
ranging from Austinian speech act theory to structuralism to Chomskian
grammar.2  These various proponents of the “linguistic turn” suggest that
“social practices could be analyzed like games, where a game is constituted
by a set of socially agreed conventions, and intelligible play consists in
applying those rules in any particular case” (Bogen, 1999, p. 9).
Bogen notes, however, that one of the glaring problems of this rules
argument approach is that the notion of “rule” is accepted as a relatively
unproblematic concept that is viewed (by these theorists) as actually guiding
the behavior of real flesh-and-blood human beings in their everyday lives.
Utilizing “rules” in this way simply elides the problem of interpretation
Wittgenstein (1958) opened up with his famous paradox of 201, the implication
of which is the indeterminacy of rules (Bogen, 1999, p. 132). Wittgenstein’s
paradox begs the question: What is the ultimate basis of normative assertion?
(Bramdon, 1994; Turner, 1998).
Further, speaking of a language game as a set of rules that competent
speakers follow implies that each set of social practices and traditions
associated with the various language games (or societies) are more or less self-
contained and isolated from one another. As Overing (1985, p. 1) notes,
Winch’s interpretation of Wittgenstein suggests that
our sense of reality is a social construction based on the conventional
discourse of our society, the corollary of which is that unrelated language
communities may well have incommensurable worldviews and rationalities.
The complication here is that, if Winch is correct, there are no universal laws
available by which to explain the varying norms, folkways, and ways of life
that characterize various cultures. There are only discrete “language games”
that make sense only within the context of each discrete culture or social
system.
This fragmentation – which has shown up most forcefully in the social
sciences in Lyotard’s (1984) postmodernist “loss of certitude” and rejection
of the “grand metanarratives” of Enlightenment philosophy – runs counter to
the Enlightenment ethos of deductive-nomothetic explanation which seeks to
uncover the laws of the social universe. This is also where Jurgen Habermas’s
(1984, 1987) program of formal pragmatics and theory of communicative
action steps into the fray. Other researchers and research traditions seem
content to work in specific, narrowly circumscribed areas of empirical inquiry
– such as the many programs oriented to the study of actual talk in concrete
social settings, most notably ethnomethodology, discourse or conversation
analysis (CA), and even some versions of speech act theory (see Geis, 1995).
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Habermas, however, is attempting to go beyond the empirical analysis of talk
or the categorization of types of speech via his Enlightenment program of
general knowledge which seeks first and foremost to uncover the universal
features of logic, order, and reason underlying all forms of talk.3
Order Without Rules?
Habermas cannot accept postmodernism’s notion of the futility of the search
for the foundations of knowledge, logic, and reason, for without this foundation
there would be no basis upon which to build a critical theory which aims at
ameliorating or eliminating objectively oppressive social arrangements. Bogen
favors, in spirit at least, Habermas’s attempt at grounding critical theory in
the normative foundations of everyday speech. But Bogen also believes the
critical, ameliorative promise of Habermas’s theory of communicative action
will never be fully realized unless or until Habermas incorporates into his
theory important insights from the various practice-based or empirical studies
of talk and understanding, whether Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology, Goffman’s
dramaturgy, CA’s program of talk-in-interaction, or even speech act theory.4
This brings us to the crux of Bogen’s problematic, which as I suggested
earlier is basically another take on the question, What is the ultimate basis of
normative assertion? If indeed we cannot recover universal standards for the
validity of everyday speech – which seems to be implied in Winch’s and others’
reading of the later Wittgenstein – there would seem to be no reasonable basis
upon which to assess the intelligibility and cogency of statements. This, as
we have seen, opens up social theory to the postmodernist loss of certitude
about the Enlightenment quest for causal explanation and general theory.
Indeed, if meaning is “endlessly deferred,” how can there exist formally valid
rules of discursive engagement; indeed, how is social order even possible?
On the matter of reason, logic, and social order, Bogen argues for a middle
ground between the analytical and empirical realms or approaches. Habermas’s
noble attempt to rescue the Enlightenment program by grounding reason in
the universal validity claims inherent in all speech has not proven effective as
a practical guideline for solving the problem of distorted (or coerced)
communication in modern society (see Chriss, 1995). However, the failure
of Habermas’s analytical program of talk and communication does not mean
we should join the postmodernists in proclaiming the “death of the subject”
or accepting the futility of general understandings of discursive and social
orders. This is because a few of the practice-based (empirical) programs have
successfully illustrated that there are
relatively stable, conventional methods by which utterances and actions
are understood, arguments are assessed, facts are constituted, and disputes
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are resolved, and that the practical methods for reasoning and acting provide
adequate grounds for persons’ conduct irrespective of appeals to universal
standards of validity or rules of conduct. (Bogen, 1999, p. 2)
Bogen dedicates chapter 4 to an analysis of the “talk-in-interaction” program
of Emanuel Schegloff, the well-known and influential sociologist and
conversation analyst. Whereas some complain that general theorists (such as
Parsons and Habermas) operate at such high levels of abstraction that they
oftentimes are unable to inform empirical research or practical application,
others complain that the practice-based programs of talk (specifically, CA)
are too narrowly focused on the minutia of talk and communication and hence
often fail to connect their empirical insights to important “macro” phenomena
of abiding interest to sociologists such as social class, stratification, power,
and social structure more generally (see Hutchby, 1999). In contrast to
Habermas’s formal (or universal) pragmatics, CA is concerned with explicating
how “lived” speech is organized. The program of capturing the minute details
of strips of talk has led to fairly well established conventions for presenting
and representing conversation between real human beings as it actually occurs
in concrete social settings. It is argued by Schegloff and others in CA that by
faithfully recording and representing talk-in-interaction, the fundamental
aspects of this particular human activity can be uncovered or discovered. No
a priori sense of “rules” or “rule-drivenness” is imposed on the analysis, and
hence CA stays closer to an inductivist strategy rather than taking the
deductive-nomothetic approach of most traditional causal analyses.
Although Bogen agrees that CA has indeed made progress in explicating
certain obdurate features of everyday talk and sense-making (see Heritage,
1999 for a summary of these accomplishments), he maintains that Schegloff
and others in CA overstate the extent to which they have avoided imposing
their own a priori sense of orderliness or rules on their data. Indeed, Schegloff’s
“discourse of the mundane” strategy, namely, the concentration on and the
reporting of the routine, mundane features of everyday talk, becomes itself
an analytical device for making sense of the multitude of instances of actual
talk to which conversation analysts turn their attention. I would go even further
than Bogen and claim that, in an important sense, the transcription devices
for recording talk that CA researchers have developed actually “produce,” as
well as simply “report on,” the orderliness discernible in talk. Bogen (1999,
p. 91) is correct in pointing out that these transcription conventions function
as a rhetorical device for setting a realist mood, much in the same fashion as
the rhetorical device of the ancient epic narrative. It is similar to the positivists’
“sober” search for the “facts.” Like the technical intelligentsia of the New
Class, CA has “painted God gray” in its prosaic, matter-of-fact attitude toward
its subject matter (Gouldner, 1976, p. 262).
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Conclusion
Even with the limitations outlined above (these paralleling the limitations of
any program of “recovery,” as Gouldner argued; see note 3), the empirical-
based programs have nonetheless illustrated the ways in which orderly courses
of social interaction are produced and recognized in situ by social actors. These
local, practical accomplishments of talk and social order – which are in effect
ethnomethodology’s objects of inquiry – provide to the analyst or theorist
explanations of logic, order, and reason that need not be grounded in a more
general, abstract, or universal sense of “rules.” This is Bogen’s “order without
rules” thesis, detailed at length in chapter 5.
Bogen returns to Wittgenstein for closure of his complex and multi-faceted
argument. The confusion over rules that has plagued social theory for ages,
but most acutely since Wittgenstein, has to do with the assumption that if
certain objective practices are discernible to the researcher, this must mean
ipso facto that the social actors engaged in any observable practice have some
sense or understanding of the “rules” which makes these practices intelligible
and accomplishable in the first place. But Bogen asks us to think of the chess
player who knows all the rules of the game, who knows how to move the
pieces, but who is not very “good” in the sense that he or she loses much of
the time. As Bogen (1999, p. 139) suggests, “playing the game badly may have
nothing to do with needing to learn some further rules, but instead may be
explained by a lack of experience, practice, or aptitude.”
The murkiness of any “rules argument” approach, then, is simply this: in
seeking to explain the reproducibility and intelligibility of social practices,
most theorists are looking not simply for the conditions necessary and
sufficient for playing the game poorly, but for those features of practice that
are related to its mastery – of being able to do something well or seemingly
effortlessly, observed as a relatively unproblematic accomplishment of, in, and
for the moment. Presumably, if something is being done “poorly” there would
be so much variance associated with the actual practice that no distinguishing
set of patterned activities could be made out by the researcher to even warrant
turning attention to the thing as an interesting or important activity in the
first place. Indeed, how could the researcher even make the assessment that
some practice was being enacted “poorly” without some prior knowledge
of a set of competent practices that mark the activity as being of a certain
type or kind?
As Bogen (and Gouldner) show, even practice-based inquiries often employ,
at some primitive level, a conception of what “competent” practice means and
what it entails, that is, what it looks like. This is why “the classical conception
of ‘rules’ is ill-suited to the demands of explicating the endogenous logic(s)
of practical social life” (Bogen, 1999, p. 140). But this is, in the end, what we
are stuck with: it generally is easier to go from a priori conceptions of
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“competent” practice (and the rules assumed to be entailed therein) to the
empirical social world, rather than from the messy, empirical social world –
with its slapdash of competent and incompetent actors and their attending
social practices – to the discovery of some set of rules underlying, energizing,
and informing these practices. In the end, Bogen has perhaps unwittingly
illustrated once again the “conservative” nature of the problem of social order,
in that it favors “masterful” or “competent” performance in some area of
social life rather than seeking out or explaining “incompetent” or “poor”
performance. The latter is the hallmark of the dispossessed and downtrodden;
in sum, of those persons or groups who in some sense are seen as “failures”
in the grand scheme of things.
James J. Chriss
Department of Sociology
Cleveland State University
Cleveland, OH 44115, USA
E-mail: j.chriss@csuohio.edu
Notes
1. As O’Neill (1995, p. 132) notes, by claiming that to understand language and society is
virtually the same thing, Winch’s position is close to that of the “double hermeneutic”
(see Giddens, 1976).
2. For example, Alvin Gouldner’s (1974, 1979) notions of the “culture of critical discourse”
and the “generative grammar” of socialism were heavily influenced by the rules argument
explicit in structuralism and Chomskian grammar. Speakers who follow the rules of
their speech community are considered to be competent speakers, in that they choose or
are able to conform to these rules. A generative grammar acts as a kind of simulation
program in that following the rules as prescribed allows one, within the context of a
community of speakers sharing the same grammar, to complete or produce what one
wishes. The generative grammar is a deep (Gouldner preferred the term “latent”) structure
that de-randomizes human conduct (Chriss, 1999). Presumably, then, all empirical
instances of social phenomena can be traced back to some relatively small set of generative
grammars (sets of rules) that make these phenomena (whether talk, socialism, a chess
game, etc.) meaningful and intelligible.
3. This distinction between Habermas’s inclination toward general theory and the empirically
based programs of actual talk is the same distinction Gouldner (1985) made between the
doctrines of holism and recovery, respectively. That is, on the one hand there are
researchers working away feverishly in one small corner of the social world to the
exclusion of being able, or even wanting, to grasp the whole (recovery). On the other
hand there are researchers creating grand, epic visions of the social whole which, in
effect, leads to a sort of social paralysis insofar as there are no ready guidelines for
establishing which substantive topics are worthy of further empirical analysis (holism)
(Chriss, 1999, p. 175).
4. Bogen rightfully notes that, for the most part, proponents of CA are critical of speech act
theory. CA views speech act theory as providing only a limited or partial view of talk
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and meaning insofar as it tends to focus on the analysis of individual sentences and
utterances in isolation from the social contexts within which they occur. By contrast, CA
emphasizes the systematic organization of sequences of talk – turn-taking being seen as
“foundational” in this sense – in their concrete interactional settings (Goodwin, 1996;
Psathas, 1990). Levinson (1992) attempts to mediate this dispute somewhat by arguing
that Wittgenstein’s paradox leads to two distinctive yet interconnected features of talk
and interaction, namely speech acts and speech activities. CA is concerned of course
primarily with the latter.
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